European Competition Law:  Recent Developments in the Pharma Sector by Hull, David
European Competition Law: 
Recent Developments in the 
Pharma Sector 





II. Late Life Cycle Management
A. Product Denigration







• Focus on 2 main areas:
– Late life cycle management.  Strategies used by 
companies to address generic entry
– Pricing.  Rebates/discount schemes and excessive 
pricing by dominant companies
• Less focus on parallel trade
• Much more enforcement at national level, 
particularly UK, Italy and France
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Recent Cases on Product Denigration
Sanofi-Aventis
• Decision in May 2013 imposing a fine of €40.6 million
• Upheld by Paris Court of Appeal in December 2014
Schering-Plough
• Decision in December 2013 imposing a fine of €15.4 million
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Key Points for Competition Authorities
• Doctors are risk averse and sceptical about new drugs or
generic versions of new drugs; they do not understand
pharmacology or laws on generic marketing approvals
and intellectual property
• Detailing visits are a key source of information for doctors
• Information should be “objective, complete and reliable”
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Sanofi - Facts
• Plavix (clopidrogrel) – blood thinner used to prevent blood
clots and heart attacks
• Sanofi had patent on a salt that extended beyond basic
patent, so generic had to use a different salt
• Sanofi had a patent on use in combination with aspirin to
treat acute coronary syndrome (ACS)
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Sanofi - What Can You Say?
Generic has different salt. 
Generic has different salt and does not have 
indication for ACS.
Generic has different salt because we have a 
patent on our salt.
Generic has different salt, but the health authority 
has found that this difference does not affect the 




• Statements should be objective, complete and reliable;
they should not be incorrect or misleading.
• Do not suggest problem with safety or efficacy of generic
without supporting evidence.
• If contradictory evidence exists (such as a finding of
bioequivalence), this should be mentioned.
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B. Agreements with Generics
Recent Cases - Agreements with Generics
Year Companies Investigated Practice Country Fines
On-going Actavis / 
Concordia
Illegal market sharing 
agreement, where Concordia 
agreed to distribute Actavis’s
product instead of competing
UK On-going
2016 GSK & Generics Illegal patent settlement 
agreements 
UK £45 million
2014 Servier & 
Generics
Illegal patent settlement 
agreements and illegal 
acquisition of a competing 
technology
EU €427.7 million
2013 Lundbeck & 
Generics
Illegal patent settlement 
agreements 
EU €146 million
2013 J&J / Sandoz Illegal market sharing 
agreement, where Sandoz 
agreed to co-promote J&J’s 




• Illegal market sharing agreements, where an originator and
generic agree to cooperate instead of compete, and the
originator’s IP rights have expired
• Patent settlements exceeding the scope of the originator’s
patent (geographic or material scope, duration) - e.g.,
Generic may not sell any products that compete with
Originator’s product (not just the product that infringes the
patent)
• Patent settlements where there is evidence that patent
was obtained by fraud or is objectively baseless
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Agreement When IP Rights Have Expired:  
J&J / Novartis
• J&J’s pain-killer, fentanyl, went off patent in the
Netherlands in 2005.
• Sandoz (Novartis sub) getting ready to launch a generic
version.
• In July 2005, Dutch subs of the parties concluded co-
promotion agreement where Sandoz would get paid a
monthly fee in return for agreement not to launch generic.
• Agreement came to an end in December 2006 when a 3d
party launched generic.
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Agreement When IP Rights Have Expired:  
J&J / Novartis
• EU Commission imposed fines: €10.7 million on J&J; €5.5
million on Novartis.
• Found that purpose of agreement was to delay launch of
generic, causing prices to remain high.
• Bad emails in file: Sandoz agreed to deal in exchange for
“part of the cake” and “to keep the current price high.”
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A.No limitation on 
competitor entry
(low risk)
B. Limitation on 
competitor entry
B.2. Value transfer to 
the competitor
(high risk)
B.1. No value transfer 
to the competitor
(low risk unless originator 
knows its patent is invalid 
or not infringed or if the 
restrictions on the 
competitor exceed the 
scope of the patent)
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The Commission’s Simplistic Analysis
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Many Counterfactuals Are Possible




Not to Enter Due 
to Patent Risks





Generic Enters At 
Risk and Loses in 
Litigation
Relevance of Reverse Payment
• Is the direction of the payment relevant?
• Commission:  reverse payment is anti-competitive because it 
suggests that Originator must think that it is likely to lose in litigation, 
so it must make a payment to keep Generic off the market
• But direction of payment is a red herring – it is a function of the 
parties’ relative bargaining positions and does not necessarily 
reflect the strength of the parties’ claims.
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Relevance of Reverse Payment
• Asymmetry of risk:
Reverse payment by Originator to Generic simply reflects asymmetry
of risk – even if Originator very likely to win, this asymmetry means
that it may not want to take a chance of losing.
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Better Approach
• Assume that patent is valid and infringed unless compelling 
evidence that Originator would lose in patent litigation.
• Assumption that patent is valid is more consistent with 
patent system than an assumption that it is invalid.
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Patent Settlements - Summary
It may violate EU competition law if a patent holder pays a competitor to cease patent 
litigation and stay off of the market, even if the patent holder is not dominant
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High-Risk Activities:
Paying a competitor to stay off of the market 
(with cash or a favourable side deal), even in 
the context of a patent settlement
Entering into a settlement restricting entry by 
the competitor if Originator knows that its 
patent is not valid or not infringed
Entering into a settlement imposing restrictions 
on the competitor that go beyond the 
restrictions that Originator could impose by 
enforcing its patents
Allowable/Low-Risk Activities:
Entering into a settlement with no 
restriction on the ability of the 
competitor to enter and compete on 
the market (even if there is a payment 
to the competitor) 
Entering into a settlement restricting 
the competitor from entering, as long 
as there is no payment or value 
transfer to the competitor
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III. Pricing
Recent Pricing Cases in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector
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Year Companies Investigated Practice Country Fines
Ongoing Aspen Excessive price increases EU
Ongoing MSD Loyalty-inducing discount 
scheme
UK
Ongoing Actavis Excessive price increases UK
2016 Flynn / Pfizer Excessive price increases UK £89.4 million
2016 Aspen Excessive price increases Italy €5.2 million
2015 Not Disclosed Loyalty-inducing discount 
scheme
UK None
2014 AstraZeneca Hospital discounts Netherlands None
2013 Schering-
Plough / Reckitt 
Benckiser
Fidelity rebates to pharmacies 
(and denigration)
France €15.3 million 
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A. Excessive Pricing
Excessive Pricing:  The Dilemma
• Excessive pricing is often seen as the quintessential evil of 
monopoly
• But recognition that high prices create incentives to innovate 
and invest and attract competition to the market.  High 
prices also encourage companies to race to get their 
products to market first, which benefits patients.
• How do you distinguish between acceptably high prices and 
excessive prices?  
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Legal Test for Excessive Pricing
 Article 102(a) provides that an abuse may consist of “directly or 
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices …”
 In United Brands (1978), the Court of Justice said that charging a 
price which is excessive because “it has no reasonable relation 
to the economic value of the product” is abusive.
 Court of Justice set out a 2-pronged test:
1. Whether the difference between the costs and the price is 
excessive;  and
2. Whether the price is either unfair
a)in itself or
b)when compared to the price of competing products.
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Problems with the Legal Test
• Is difference between price / costs excessive?
– Difficult to determine costs
– What is “excessive”?
• Is the price unfair “in itself”?
– What is “in itself”?
• Is the price unfair when compared to competing products?
– Comparisons difficult
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Difficulties with Applying Test in Pharma Sector
• Which costs?  Most significant costs for drugs are the R&D 
costs.  How do you allocate them over time and across 
countries?
– Costs do not capture all the costs of the high failure rate in 
bringing a drug to market.
– Higher prices may reflect superior efficacy and fewer side 
effects, which reduces long-term costs to national health 
budgets – need to look at health technology assessments.  
– National pricing and reimbursement regimes limit freedom of 
pharma companies in setting prices.
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Addressing Excessive Pricing in Pharma Sector:
Policy Issues
• Competition authorities are generally reluctant to launch 
cases:
– Application of legal test raises very difficult questions (e.g. what 
is the correct price)
– Interference with pricing could chill innovation in a sector 
where innovation is key – high prices are the carrot that 
encourages companies to invest in R&D
– Unnecessary in light of the strong buyer power exercised by 
national health authorities and other payors.  Some Member 
States now considering joint buying arrangements.
– Pricing of medicines a national issue for Member States
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Napp (UK)(2001)
• Napp sold sustained release morphine to hospitals at steep discounts 
and charged much higher prices to pharmacies, which the OFT found 
to be excessive.
• OFT found that the prices charged to pharmacies were above the 
level that would be charged in a competitive market.
• Exclusionary conduct in hospital sector linked to excessive pricing in 
pharmacy sector
• OFT looked at a range of comparators:
– Prices were between 30 and 50% higher than competitors
– List prices to pharmacies were, in some instances, more than 2000% higher 
than those in hospitals
– Prices to pharmacies were 500% higher than those for export
– Napp’s gross market was over 80%, while it was less than 70% for Napp’s
most profitable competitor 
– CAT upheld the OFT’s decision.
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Gilead
• On 22 December 2014, the European Commission declined to open an 
investigation into allegations of excessive prices for Gilead’s hepatitis C 
drugs, despite pressure from members of the European Parliament.  
• Commissioner Vestager responded to the Parliamentary Question (P-
008636/2014) as follows:
Pursuant to Article 168(7) TFEU, Member States are responsible for health 
and medical care, including the allocation of resources assigned to these 
areas. Each Member State may therefore take measures to regulate or 
influence the prices in these areas. 
For this reason, price-setting by pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
healthcare systems in general takes place on a national level, allowing 
Member States to exercise their bargaining power. … 
Moreover … the market for hepatitis C drugs is a rapidly moving 
therapeutic area, with several new classes of direct-acting antivirals now in 




• On 15 March 2015, Commissioner Vestager responded to a 
follow-up Parliamentary Question (000261/2015) as follows:
Since the Commission's earlier response, as it can be ascertained 
from public sources, the factual situation surrounding this particular 
medicine has evolved further. For example, another novel 
medicine such as AbbVie's Viekira Pak has entered the market to 
compete with Sovaldi in addition to, for example, Janssen's Olysio. 
Furthermore, several Member States have concluded or are 
negotiating pricing and reimbursing agreements with respect to this 
group of novel Hepatitis C medicines.
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Flynn Pharma / Pfizer
• In December 2016, the UK CMA fined Pfizer and Flynn Pharma a 
total of £89.4 million for charging excessive prices for  an anti-
epilepsy drug.   
• According to the CMA, prior to 2012, Pfizer manufactured and 
marketed the drug under the brand name Epanutin. 
• Pfizer then transferred the UK marketing rights to Flynn Pharma, 
which “genericised” the drug and started selling it in September 
2012 at prices alleged to be 2,300% to 2,600% higher than Pfizer’s 
historical prices.  
• The decision covered both Pfizer’s supply prices to Flynn Pharma 
and Flynn Pharma’s prices to the market.




• High risks arise from drastic price increases after drug is on 
market:
– UK and Italian cases concern drastic price increases (250% or more)
– Cases involved drugs that were already on the market – easier to 
bring case as a “fair” price (i.e. the price prior to the increase) has 
already been established – no need to compare with competing 
products
• Such risks would not appear to arise in the context of:
– Initial price setting or pricing and reimbursement negotiations with 
the health authority




Warning – A Complicated Topic
• Low prices are good except when they are bad  
• If a company is dominant, granting conditional rebates or 
discounts could potentially constitute an abuse triggering large 
fines
• Competition enforcers struggle to strike a balance between 
allowing companies to compete vigorously on price and 
preventing companies with market power from using 




• The Basic Principle: A dominant company may not impose an
obligation on a customer to purchase all or most of its
requirements of a product from it because competitors are then
foreclosed from the market.
• “Conditional” Rebates: Rebates can achieve the same effect as
a straightforward exclusive purchase obligation by making the
grant of the rebate conditional on the customer obtaining all or
a portion of its requirements from the dominant company.
• Dominance: Only a problem if company is dominant – no
problem for products where company is not dominant.
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No Clear Rules
• The EU case law sets out formalistic rules that do not sit well with 
economic theory
– The 2014 Intel judgment upheld the Commission’s €1.06 billion fine 
for exclusivity rebates, relying on a form-based legal standard
– The 2015 Post Danmark II judgment rejected the argument that an 
as-efficient competitor test is necessary to find that retroactive 
rebates violate EU competition law
• The Commission promotes an economic approach this is more 
coherent, but hard to apply in practice
• Can’t ignore the case law because national courts and 
competition authorities may follow it and the Commission can 
fall back on it when it needs to
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European Commission
• In its Article 102 Guidance Paper, the European Commission 
sets out an analytical framework for the analysis of 
rebate/discount systems that is based on economic theory 
that can lead to results that are different from the rigid, 
formalistic rules developed in the case law
• The core concept is the “as-efficient-competitor” (AEC) test:  
if an equally-efficient competitor can compete effectively 
with the pricing conduct of the dominant company, the 
Commission says that it generally will infer that the dominant 
firm’s pricing is unlikely to have an adverse impact on 
effective competition and will be unlikely to intervene
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Types of Discounts and Level of Risk
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Type Description Level of Risk
Unconditional 
Discount 





If the customer reaches a specified volume 





If the customer reaches a specified volume 
threshold, they receive a discount on all purchases 
(both below and above the threshold)
Very High
Exclusivity Discounts conditional upon the customer agreeing 
to purchase all or most of their requirements from the 
dominant supplier
Very High
Discounts applicable to all purchases, with no minimum volume 
thresholds or conditions limiting purchase of competing products
– Unconditional discounts are generally unlikely to raise significant risks under EU
competition law
– Low pricing is generally pro-competitive and necessary due to pressure from
competitors or strong payors
– In theory, a pharmaceutical supplier could offer low prices in order to drive a
competitor out of the market, and thereafter raise prices (referred to as
predatory pricing), but
• such a strategy seems unlikely in the pharmaceutical industry as payors
will generally not allow any subsequent price increases; and
• no cases by EU or national competition authorities successfully
prosecuting predatory pricing in the pharmaceutical industry, absent an





Prices are €10 per patient, with the following
incremental discounts: 20% above 10
patients, 40% above 20 patients, 60% above
30 patients
The customer receives a discount if they reach a specified volume 
















 Incremental discounts raise less risk than
exclusivity or retroactive discounts, but are
not without risk
 There are few cases on incremental
discounts, so no clear legal standard
established by the EU Courts
 The European Commission’s guidance
indicates that such discounts may be
illegal if they unfairly exclude competitors
 In order to assess the level of risk, it is
necessary to conduct a price-cost test
Example: 
Our prices are €10/per patient, but we will
grant you a 10% discount on all patients if at
least 10 patients are treated
Under this discount, if the customer treats
9 patients, the price is €90 (€10 * 9 
patients, with no discount)
10 patients, the price is still €90 (€10*10 
patients, with a 10% discount on all 
patients)
The effect of this discount is that the last
treatment is free, which means that the
customer would never purchase that
treatment from a competitor
The customer receives a discount if it reaches a specified volume 
threshold, and the discount applies on all purchases (both below and 
above the threshold)
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 Likely illegal under EU competition law if
a supplier is dominant
 Discounts do not explicitly prevent a
customer from buying from competitors,
but the discounts may have the same
effect
 Smaller competitors and new entrants
may not be able to compete, even if
their prices (on average) are lower than
those of the dominant supplier
 While some retroactive discounts may
not harm competition from other
suppliers, they still raise high risks because




We will grant you an extra discount if you
purchase exclusively from us (and not
from competitors) for a period of 1 year
You will receive an extra discount if you
agree to purchase at least 75% of your
needs from us
Even if a customer is only required to
purchase 75% from the Company, it
could still constitute “all or most” of the
customers requirements, and thus be
treated as an exclusivity discount
Discounts granted on the condition that the customer purchases
all or most of their requirements from the dominant supplier
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Exclusivity Discounts
Almost always illegal under EU competition
law if a supplier is dominant
Can make it difficult or impossible for smaller
competitors or new entrants to compete in
the market
It is not necessary for an authority to examine
the effects of an exclusivity discount in order
to find that it is illegal
Intel was fined €1.06 billion for imposing
exclusivity discounts that limited the ability of
AMD to compete
Additional Issues
• Price-based foreclosure in the pharmaceutical sector is most 
likely in pricing and reimbursement negotiations with payors
– In many countries, doctors are not price sensitive and/or do not 
know the net prices
– Need to assess whether a proposed pricing strategy would unfairly 
cause a payor to limit access of a competitor to the market (e.g. 
refusing or limiting reimbursement)
• Commercial pricing strategies differ significantly in the 
pharmaceutical sector than in other industries
– Payors have fixed annual budgets and yet limited scope to control 
the volumes of products used each year
– Discounts are often necessary to address concerns regarding 
uncertain level of demand – raising a possible objective justification
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Example
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Critical Question:
Is the 15% discount 
retroactive?
Risk Assessment:
• If yes – higher risk





















Is the scheme retroactive or 
incremental?
Risk Assessment:
• If retroactive – higher risk 
• If incremental – need to apply 
price-cost test
Example
Proposal: We will give them a 15% discount if they increase their 
purchases from last year
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Critical Question:
Is the 15% discount retroactive or incremental?
Risk Assessment:
• If retroactive – higher risk
• If incremental – need to apply price/cost test
Example
Proposal: The hospital has said that they will buy all of their 
requirements from us if we offer an extra 10% discount
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Risk Assessment:
Very high risk – exclusivity discount
The fact that it is requested by the customer is not a valid defense
Summary Guidance
• Exclusivity discounts will create very high risks – presumptively
unlawful
• Retroactive discounts also create very high risks
– Courts or national competition authorities may take a very formal
approach, with no or little quantitative assessment
– The Article 102 Guidance is only binding on the European
Commission, not national authorities
• Incremental discounts
– Lower risk than exclusivity or retroactive discounts
– Necessary to apply cost-price test to evaluate risk of unfair harm to
competitors
• Flat pricing without any volume requirements is generally low risk
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